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As this Issue of IBPP is being readied for posting, there is significant controversy in France over the 
political viability and morality of conservative politicians accepting support from the far-right National 
Front in regional assemblies. President Jacques Chirac, France's President, has strongly attacked 
accepting such support and has derogatorily termed the National Front's leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, a 
fanatic. 
 
Whatever one might think about the charges of racism, national chauvinism, and xenophobia against 
the National Front, one should pause when considering the fanatic label. Often the term denotes 
excessive zeal and irrational attachment to a cause. Yet it is most often used towards people with whom 
one very strongly and substantively disagrees--as if some mild to moderate degree of divergence of 
substantive opinion, as opposed to means of implementation, may be grudgingly tolerated, but no more 
than that. And as if people with whom one agrees are less likely fanatics. This seems to especially be the 
case, since the descriptor irrational is less often employed to denote a significant disparity from 
normative reason and logic and more often employed to suggest a very strong difference of opinion at 
times linked with a hyper-reason and hyper-logic. 
 
In any event, a significant implication and problem with the fanaticism term is the suggestion that there 
may be no opinions, beliefs, values, goals, and acts worth defending or attempting to achieve by all 
means necessary. Is this so? Should this be so? Are examples of fanaticism throughout history nothing 
more than oppositional counterpoints to what is now termed postmodernism? 
 
There may be many appropriate verbal approaches in an attack on the French far-right. Fanaticism may 
even service these attacks, not constitute them. (See Mead, M. (1977). Fanaticism: The panhuman 
disorder. Etc., 34, 35-58; Milgram, S. (1977). The social meaning of fanaticism. Etc., 34, 58-61; Whitney, 
C.R. (March 25, 1998). Chirac puts regional allies on the spot. The New York Times, p. A9.) (Keywords: 
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